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In so far as diplomats are concerned, their immunity from legal process arises under customary
international law and treaty law (i.e., the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,’ the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations,2 and the New York Convention on Special Missions’ (or “New
York Convention”)). All three conventions state in their preliminaries that diplomatic immunity
and privilege arise from international custom and that their function is not to benefit individuals,
but to ensure the smooth and efficient performance of their duties in the interest of comity and of
friendly relations between sovereign nations.
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Privileges and immunities apply to different categories of
persons (i.e., persons performing official acts, diplomats, and
heads of state). In addition, states, government agencies, and
corporate entities acting on behalf of, or to the benefit of, na-
tions also enjoy immunity within certain limits.
Persons performing official acts by reason of their official
capacity or functions may be immune from the judicial and ad-
ministrative processes of their own state, the state where they are
performing such recognized official acts, or in any state where
their official acts have effect. Such immunity is usually afforded
by the law of the state on behalf of which those persons are act-
ing.
In so far as diplomats are concerned, their immunity from
legal process arises under customary international law and treaty
law (i.e., the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,' the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 2 and the New York
Convention on Special Missions' (or "New York Convention")).
All three conventions state in their preliminaries that diplomatic
immunity and privilege arise from international custom and that
their function is not to benefit individuals, but to ensure the
smooth and efficient performance of their duties in the interest
of comity and of friendly relations between sovereign nations.
To claim diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Conven-
* Partner, Schellenberg Wittmer. All translations are provided by the author.
1. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention), Dec. 14,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
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tion on Diplomatic Relations, a person must be a "diplomatic
agent"-that is "the Head of the Mission or a member of the
diplomatic staff of the Mission." Such persons must present
themselves prior to their appointment and acceptance of their
appointment, after which time they are accredited and put on
the list of diplomatic persons held by the receiving state.
Other persons protected by special immunity are heads of
state and their relatives (to which should be added heads of gov-
ernment and their relatives). Whereas diplomatic immunity is
adequately regulated by the two Vienna Conventions and the
New York Convention, the international status of heads of state
is not clearly defined by treaty law. The New York Convention
only considers that status to the extent that the head of state and
his relatives are officially visiting another state.
The immunity of heads of state is governed by customary
international law supplemented by domestic law. It is common
knowledge that a head of state is totally immune from the pro-
cess of criminal law. Nevertheless, international law has progres-
sively imposed personal responsibility on high-ranking officials
(including heads of state) for universal crimes, such as grave vio-
lations of human rights or the law of war. It may be assumed
that immunity for diplomats and heads of state from prosecution
for international crimes is now in the process of being settled
after much legal debate. The Nuremberg4 and Tokyo5 War
Crime trials prosecuted persons who could have been deemed
excludable from prosecution, since they fell in the "immunised"
category and established the principle of non-immunity of heads
of state in accordance with the precedent established in Article
227 of the Treaty of Versailles,6 which provided the basis of the
prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II. As stated by Sir Arthur Watts:
4. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (entered into force Aug. 8, 1945), annexed to the
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
5. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Special Procla-
mation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.IJS. No. 1589, reprinted in 4 TRATI-Es AND OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE UNrrED
STATES OF AMERIcA 27 (1946).
6. Treaty of the Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany,
June 28, 1919, art. 227, 2 Bevans, S. Treaty Doc. No. 66-49, reproduced in 13 Am.J. INT'L
L., No. 3, Supplement Official Documents, 151 (July 1919).
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While generally the international law .. .does not directly
involve obligations on individuals personally, that is not al-
ways appropriate, particularly for acts of such seriousness that
they constitute nor merely international wrongs (in the broad
sense of a civil wrong) but rather international crimes which
offend against the public order of the international commu-
nity .... It can no longer be doubted that as a matter of
general customary international law a Head of State will per-
sonally be liable to be called to account if there is sufficient
evidence that he authorised or perpetrated such serious inter-
national crimes.
This is the position also taken by the House of Lords in its Pi-
nochet II judgement,8 for " [h] ow can it be for international law
purposes an official function to do something which interna-
tional law itself prohibits and criminalises?" 9
In addition to individuals, states themselves enjoy immunity
in accordance with international custom. In the absence of
treaty law-save the European Convention on the Immunity of
States,10 which has only been ratified by a small number of Euro-
pean states-the extent to which a foreign nation (or its govern-
ment agencies and corporate entities) may rely on the doctrine
of sovereignty to claim immunity from legal process will depend
very much on domestic law.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal, which is Switzerland's Supreme Court, has held
consistently that state sovereignty is relative and not absolute.
Immunity may only be claimed by a foreign state acting pursuant
to its sovereign powers (jure imperii). Most contractual, commer-
cial, trading, and financial arrangements involving a foreign
state (jure gestionis) are not covered by sovereign immunity."
7. Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of
Governments and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DE COUR DE L'AcADtNMIE DE DROrr INTER-
NATIONAL 1, 82-4 (1995); see also JEAN SALMON, MANUEL DE DRorr DIPLOMATIQUE 591
(1996).
8. Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others
Ex parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999).
9. Id. at 594.
10. European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 470.
11. See, e.g., Jean-Frangois Egli, L'immuniti de Juridiction et dExicution des Etats
Etrangers et de Leurs Agents dans la Jurisprudence du Tribunal Fidiral, in CENTENAIRE DE LA
Loi MtDtRALE SUR LA POURSurrE POUR DErrES ET FAiLLE 202 (L. Dalleves et al. eds.,
1989); Christian Dominice, Immunitis dejuridiction et dExicution des Etats et Chefs ditat
Etrangers, in LEs FIcHEsJUIDIQUES SuissFs 934 (1942).
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The nature of the transaction-and not its finality-will de-
termine whether it falls within the ambit of sovereign immunity.
There is abundant case law on this subject.12 If a foreign state is
not immune to the process of the Swiss Courts, then it is not
immune to the enforcement of a final and binding judgement
arising from that process.' 3
Nevertheless, enforcement will be denied if the assets sub-
jected to the debt collection procedure are allocated to the per-
formance of public duties. The concept of "allocation to public
duties" has been broadly interpreted. 14 Measures of compul-
sion, including the lifting of banking secrecy, are therefore per-
missible to ensure the enforcement ofjudgements involving for-
eign states in respect to claims for which immunity has been de-
nied.
Whereas state immunity with respect to civil and commer-
cial claims is relative, immunity of a head of state from criminal
prosecution or investigation is absolute. The Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal has clearly acknowledged this rule:
At all times international customary law has afforded Heads
of state and their relatives the privileges of personal unvio-
lability and immunity from the process of criminal law ....
Contrary to immunity in civil proceedings which has always
12. Federal case law considers the following activities to be included in state sover-
eignty (jure imperii): a public loan designed to carry out public functions that are the
subject of a Treaty between two states; tasks performed by the armed forces, including
the destruction of a foreign aircraft flying without authorization over the state's terri-
tory; nationalization and expropriation; and the attribution to the state of objects of
historical or archaeological significance. Federal case law considers the following to be
excluded from state sovereignty (ure gestionis): funds borrowed by the central bank of a
foreign state on the financial markets; works designed to build or overhaul a building
designed to be used by a foreign embassy; certain employment contracts; rental agree-
ments, even if the premises are designed to be used by the diplomatic mission of a
foreign state; brokerage agreements, even if the main contract is relevant to state sover-
eignty; a stock purchase agreement affecting a company carrying out official functions
on behalf of a foreign state.
13. Royaume de Grece v. Banque Julius Bar et Cie, 23 I.L.R 195 (1956).
14. For instance, equipment used for a national railway system is considered to be
immune; likewise for the shares of an international company established by treaty and
entrusted with the performance of public functions. Two buildings, property of the
Spanish Government and designed to be used for social or cultural activities, were also
considered immune, and the same conclusion was reached with respect to a National
Bureau of Tourism building sponsored by a foreign state. Assets held by a bank are
only considered to be immune if they are specifically allocated to public functions. 111
OFFICIAL REPORTER OF THE JUDGMENTS OF THE Sviss FEDERAL TRIBUNAL 1-62; 108 Id. III-
107; 86 Id. 1-32.
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been held to be relative, immunity from prosecution of a
Head of state is total .... Heads of state therefore benefit
from total immunity in foreign states in respect of any con-
duct which should ordinarily fall within the jurisdiction of
those states regardless of the legal basis of that jurisdiction.
This privilege recognised in favour of the highest dignitary of
the foreign state is limited on the one hand by the will of that
state and, on the other hand, by the duration of the functions
of the Head of state. 5
In a recent, unpublished decision of March 8, 1999,16 the
Federal Tribunal signaled that immunity attaching to an acting
head of state may not be absolute after all. In the case at hand,
an examining magistrate of the Canton of Geneva, who was in-
vestigating allegations of forgery and money laundering pursu-
ant to the execution of letters of rogatory issued by the French
Government, disregarded banking secrecy and ordered the
seizure of bank records pertaining to an account held by an off-
shore company for the benefit of the personal adviser, and
agent, of the President of Gabon. The adviser himself claimed
diplomatic immunity, as he happened to be the spouse of Ga-
bon's ambassador to Switzerland. The magistrate's order was up-
held by the Geneva Court and the Federal Tribunal, which con-
sidered that immunity of jurisdiction could only have been rec-
ognized if the account holder had been a government agency of
the Republic of Gabon rather than an offshore corporation.
This judgement, however, should be examined cautiously. The
Federal Tribunal has very limited powers to review the cantonal
decision and the President of Gabon was neither the account
15. Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, 115 OFFICIAL REPORTER OF THE JUDGMENTS OF
THE SwIss FEDERAL TRIBUNAL 496. Following is the quotation as it appeared in the origi-
nal text.
Le droit international coutumier a de tout temps reconnu aux chefs d'Etat-
ainsi qu'aux membres de leur famille ... les privileges de l'inviolabilit6 per-
sonnelle et de l'immunit6 de juridiction pfnale . . . . Au contraire de
l'immunit6 dejuridiction civile, toujours discutfe et relativisfe, l'immunit6 de
juridiction p~nale du chef d'Etat est totale .... Les chefs d'Etat b~nfficient
donc d'une immunit6 dejuridiction totale dans les Etats &rangers pour tous
les actes qui tomberaient ordinairement sous lajuridiction de ces Etats, quel
que soit le crit~re de rattachement des actes incriminfs. Ce privilfge, reconnu
pour le profit de l'Etat &ranger A son plus haut dignitaire, trouve ses limites,
d'une part, dans la volont6 de cet Etat et, d'autre part, dans la durfe des fonc-
tions du Chef d'Etat.
Id.
16. Ref. 1P.631/1998 and 1P.633/1998 (Swiss Federal Tribunal Mar. 8, 1999).
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holder, nor the person identified in the bank records as the ben-
eficial owner of the assets held on the account. The Federal Tri-
bunal could safely rely on the principle-widely acknowledged
under Swiss Law-that an individual who chooses to interpose a
corporate vehicle to shield his identity is bound by the legal ap-
pearances that he has himself created. The real issue is whether
the Federal Tribunal-exercising full judicial review-would
have reached the conclusion that assets that are de facto con-
trolled by a head of state are not protected by immunity because
of the legal structure that has been put into place.
What happens when a person enjoying immunity is no
longer in function? The legal status of a former ambassador is
covered by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Ar-
ticle 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
provides that an ambassador enjoys immunity in relation to his
official acts, while he was an official. This limited immunity, ra-
tione materiae, is to be contrasted with the former immunity, ra-
tione personae, which provides complete immunity to all activities,
whether public or private. It appears to be the position at com-
mon law that a former head of state enjoys similar immunities,
ratione materiae, once he ceases to be head of state. He too loses
immunity, ratione personae, on ceasing to be head of state. Thus,
at common law, the position of the former ambassador and the
former head of state appears to be much the same; both would
enjoy immunity for acts done in performance of their respective
functions while in office.
The Swiss courts have not dealt specifically with the same
issue. In the case of the former President of the Philippines, the
Federal Tribunal rejected a claim that Ferdinand Marcos was en-
titled to immunity as a former head of state, but his immunity
had been specifically waived by the Republic of the Philippines,
which had begun litigation in Switzerland to recover or freeze
assets that it claimed was the property of the Republic, improp-
erly possessed or controlled by Marcos and his relatives."7
A similar conclusion was reached in the case of Jean-Claude
Duvalier (Baby Doc),18 the former "life President" of Haiti. Mr.
Duvalier's immunity had also been lifted by the Haitian Govern-
ment. The Federal Tribunal's ruling in this case starkly contrasts
17. See supra note 15
18. Jean-Claude Duvalier, Ref. 1A.58/1989 (Swiss Federal Tribunal Sept. 19, 1989).
13392000]
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with ajudgment of the French Cour de Cassation"9 in the same
case. The French Cour de Cassation decided that the claims
brought by the Republic of Haiti were inadmissible, in so far as
the French Courts could not exercise jurisdiction for the pur-
pose of enforcing claims of foreign states based on their public
law. It is interesting to note that a U.L court had granted a
worldwide Mareva injunction in aid of the French proceedings
under Article 24 of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters.2 ° The jurisdictional basis of the U.K. order was the choice
by the Duvalier family of a U.C firm of solicitors, which held
eleven accounts in their name in various jurisdictions. The
Duvalier family was ordered not to deal with assets, wherever sit-
uated, which represented the proceeds of the sums claimed in
the French proceedings and were further ordered to allow in-
spection of documents and disclose information relating to their
worldwide assets. The injunction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeal on account of:
[T]he plain and admitted intention of the Defendants to
move their assets out of the reach of the Courts of Law, cou-
pled with the resources they have obtained and the skill
which they have hitherto shown in doing that, and the vast
amount of money involved. This case demands international
co-operation between all nations.2'
In light of the recently adopted Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (or "OECD") Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions22 (or "OECD Convention") and the
greater public sensitivity to the issue of recovering stolen prop-
erty from deposed rulers, the legal battle to curtail personal im-
munities and privileges is gathering momentum. The OECD
19. The judgement of the Cour de Cassation was partly based on the 1977 Resolu-
tion of the Institut de Droit International, resolving that public law claims should be
considered inadmissible if they were related to the exercise of governmental power,
unless the subject matter of the claim, the needs of international co-operation, or the
interests of the states concerned required a different result. See 57 ANNUAIRE DE
L'INsTrTT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 328 (1977).
20. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, as amended, O.J. C 189 (1990), 72 U.N.T.S. 147.
21. See supra note 19.
22. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, at v (1998).
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Convention aims at reducing the influx of corrupt payments into
relevant markets by punishing the active bribe givers as well as by
establishing a preventive framework. Consistent with the princi-
pal rationale of creating a level-playing field of commerce, it
does attempt a consistent global recognition of the public offi-
cial that should clearly encompass heads of state or of govern-
ment.
This being said, the OECD Convention so far is limited to
covering active corruption of foreign public officials. Other Eu-
ropean initiatives go beyond this objective. The Council of Eu-
rope has prepared a Criminal Law Convention,2 3 adopted in No-
vember 1998 by the Council of Ministers, which adopts a very
broad notion of corruption, including active and passive domes-
tic bribery of all sorts of officials, transnational bribes, as well as
trading in influence. The European Union has enacted four
treaties and protocols on the protection of financial interests of
the European Community, focused on criminalization of trans-
national bribery. The European Commission is trying to de-
velop supranational law against corruption under the First Pillar
Provisions of Community Law by considering OECD anti-corrup-
tion issues, such as tax treatment of bribes and audit rules. Fi-
nally, the European Parliament is supporting an initiative to
unify criminal law, including transnational and supranational
bribery in the context of the European Union, in the form of a
corpus juris.
Banking secrecy is in the midst of this dispute. Relevant in-
ternational instruments-which have been briefly reviewed
above-are sending clear signals that banking secrecy will not be
allowed to stand in the way of the international community's cur-
rent agenda on fighting worldwide corruption.
Banking secrecy-which is a well-known feature of Swiss
Banking Law-can best be described as the protection of the
confidential contractual relationship between the bank and its
customer, reinforced by a provision of criminal law. This crimi-
nal provision makes it an offense to disclose matters pursuant to
that confidential relationship, subject to the usual qualifications:
disclosure under compulsion of law or by the customer's waiver
of secrecy. Immunity is a second layer of privilege, which pro-
tects its recipient from the ordinary process of the courts. How
23. Europ. T.S. No. 173.
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do these two forms of privilege interface, and why would persons
entitled to immunity seek the additional benefit of banking se-
crecy?
Switzerland offers a unique perspective to the debate on
these matters, as a substantial number of acting heads of state or
deposed rulers have held, or are still holding, some of their as-
sets in Swiss bank accounts. Most decisions of the Swiss Courts-
and more particularly of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Switzer-
land's Supreme Court)-deal with assets allegedly plundered by
deposed rulers when they were in office. Unsurprisingly, Swit-
zerland has become one of the main fora of the legal warfare
waged between former heads of state and law enforcement initia-
tives, involving countries as diverse as the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, and Ukraine. In all the cases con-
sidered by the Swiss courts, immunity has been waived by foreign
states seeking to gain control of assets allegedly misappropriated.
Banking secrecy has never been considered as a defense, or a
barrier, to the provision of mutual assistance by the Swiss Courts.
In spite of obvious political overtones surrounding some of these
cases, banking secrecy has been lifted, assets have been seized,
and, in a few instances, handed over to the requesting state. Re-
cent developments suggest that even acting heads of state could
be identified as targets of investigations piercing their "secret"
bank accounts.
The current anti-money laundering guidelines of the Swiss
Federal Banking Commission advise Swiss banks to exercise cau-
tion in transacting business with foreign dignitaries, referred to
somewhat obliquely as "potentates." The opening of an account
by a potentate should be cleared at the highest level of manage-
ment of the bank.
There is little doubt that renewed efforts to establish an "in-
ternational rule of law" will affect the scope and possibly the na-
ture of individual privileges and immunities. The real issue for
the courts will be to perform a fair balancing act to ensure that
their process is not open to abuse or manipulation for purely
political ends. The stark choice will be to allow claims against
persons enjoying immunity or to disallow them on grounds of
non-inquiry in the internal affairs of a foreign state. As sug-
gested by Laurence Collins: "To allow such claims might allow
foreign Courts to be turned into political instruments. To disal-
STATE AND DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES
low them would be to allow stolen property on an enormous
scale to stay in the hands of thieves."24 Mr. Collins appropriately
recommends that international cooperation should prevail, sub-
ject to the important valve of public policy. Courts in Switzer-
land and elsewhere cannot ignore that such proceedings are
often driven by political issues that need to be satisfactorily ad-
dressed and resolved to prevent abuse. If the claim to assets is
based on doubtful evidence, or in manipulation of the law, or
made by successors who are themselves likely to engage in misap-
propriation of state property, "then it would be entirely legiti-
mate for a foreign Court to refuse to adjudicate on the ground
that proper evidence cannot be obtained or that there are no
appropriate manageable judicial standards for adjudication of
the claim." 25
In other words, the issue confronting scholars, lawyers, and
courts alike is whether individual privileges and immunities are
likely to follow the same path as state sovereign immunity itself
and become relative (i.e., their scope will be determined in ac-
cordance with public policy considerations) instead of being en-
joyed in the absolute form which has prevailed hitherto.
24. See Laurence Collins, Recovey of Stolen Property from Deposed Rulers, in ETUDES DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN L'HONNEUR DE PIRRE LALVE 221-29 (C. Dorninice et al. eds.
1993).
25. Id. at 230.
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